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THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT:
ADVANCES FOR THE CREATOR
I. FRED KOENIGSBERG*
O N OCTOBER 19, 1976, PRESmENT GERALD R. FORD signed the Copyright Act
of 1976,' the first complete revision of United States copyright law since
the Copyright Act of 1909.2 The 1909 Act, passed during the final days of
Theodore Roosevelt's administration,3 was written before the technological
explosion of the 20th century. It became outdated almost immediately after
its enactment, and efforts at a complete revision began as early as 1924.
4
Revision efforts during the 1920s and 1930s were unsuccessful, and were
stalled entirely during the Second World War. After the war, the United
States copyright community focused its attention upon the achievement of an
international copyright treaty to which the United States would be a party.
When the Universal Copyright Convention came into force in 1955, the effort
to revise the outmoded 1909 Copyright Act began anew.5 It took twenty-one
years of studies, draftsmanship, hearings, and debates to achieve this revision.
The 1976 Copyright Act represents a major advance for the creator. This
is not to say that every provision is favorable to the creator. The new law is
extremely complex, and the effects of many of its provisions are even now the
subject of debate. The improvements of the new law over the 1909 Copy-
right Act are of such significance, however, as to justify its characterization by
the Register of Copyrights as "an author's bill."6 This paper, based upon a
panel discussion of the new law held at the Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts
National Art Law Conference on December 3, 1976, in which the author
participated, will outline some of the major advances for the creator in the
1976 Copyright Act.
I. THE Two MOST SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES
Unquestionably, the two most significant advances for the creator will be
found in the new law under the heading of "Duration of Copyright."7 The
first, federal preemption of copyright law, concerns a subject that touches not
* B.A., Cornell Univ.; M.A.C., Annenberg School of Communications, Univ. of Pennsylva-
nia; J.D., Columbia Univ.; Attorney, Office of General Counsel, American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers, New York, New York.
'Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810
(West Supp. 1977)).
1 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320,35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970)) (repealed
1976).
3 The 1909 Act was signed into law on March 4, 1909, the last day of Theodore Roosevelt's
term in office and the date of William Howard Taft's inauguration.
4 H.R. 8177,68th Cong., 1st Sess., (1924) 65 CONC. REC. 4912; H.R. 9137,68th Cong., lst Sess.,
(1924) (65 CONG. REC. 8552).
5 H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5659, 5660 [hereinafter cited as 1976 HousE REPOr].
6 Remarks by Hon. Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights, at "Program on the 1976
Copyright Act," in New York City (May 7, 1977).
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. ch. 3 (West Supp. 1977).
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only on duration, but on many other matters as well. The subject of the
second advance, the copyright term, deals with the actual duration of
copyright protection.
A. Federal Preemption of Copyright
Since the enactment of the first federal copyright law in 1790,8 the United
States has had a unique and confusing dual system of copyright. After
"creation" but prior to "publication" 9 of a work, as the terms are used in the
copyright sense, protection was a matter of state statutory or common law.
Once "publication" took place, state common law protection ceased, and the
only protection available was under the federal copyright statute. If the
author did not comply with the federal copyright requirements at the time of
"publication," the work lost all protection and passed into the public
domain. 0 To complicate matters further, certain types of works could be
registered for federal copyright protection prior to publication, while such
protection was not available to other types of unpublished works.' The result
was a confusing system of copyright protection like no other in the world.
This bifurcation of protection and the attendant confusion has been
remedied by the new law, which abolishes the dual system of copyright and
substitutes a single unified system of federal copyright protection.1 2 Initially,
it might appear that federal preemption works to the detriment of the creator.
State common law had extended protection in perpetuity, while federal
protection, by constitutional mandate, is limited in duration.' 3 For many
reasons, however, federal preemption is a major advance for the creator.1 4
First, it is widely recognized that federal copyright offers far better
protection than state common law. For example, in any infringement action
the prima facie evidentiary weight granted to a federal copyright certificate
shifts the burden of proof regarding the validity of the copyright and the facts
' Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
9 Publication, in the copyright sense, is generally taken to occur when:
by consent of the copyright owner, the original or tangible copies of a work are sold,
leased, loaned, given away, or otherwise made available to the general public, or when
an authorized offer is made to dispose of the work in any such manner even if a sale or
other such disposition does not in fact occur.
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPvYRIGT § 49 (1976).
"0 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
"17 U.S.C. § 12 (1970) (repealed 1976). Types of unpublished works which could be
registered include lectures, dramatic, musical, or dramatico-musical compositions, motion
picture photoplays or other motion pictures, photographs, works of art, plastic works, and
drawings.
12 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. 301(a) (West Supp. 1977).
"The Congress shall have power ... to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries . . .- U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
'1 S. REP. No. 94473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 112-116 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 SENATE
REPORT]; 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 129-133. However, preemption does not prevent
states from protecting "[t]he evolving common law rights of 'privacy,' "publicity,' trade secrets,
and the general laws of defamation and fraud, as long as the causes of action contain elements,
such as an invasion of personal rights or breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind
from copyright infringement." Id. at 132.
[V7ol. 26: 515
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contained in the certificate.'5 The ability to press claims in federal courts
which are familiar with copyright litigation, rather than in state courts which
do not have equal sophistication, also works to the creator's advantage. A
single, national, and uniform system of copyright frees the creator and his
counsel from concern over differences in the common law of the various
states.
Further, given the abolition of state common law protection, federal
copyright need no longer be based on the concept of "publication."'"
Accordingly, the new law allows registration of all types of unpublished
works,' 7 and all authors, not only those whose works attain sufficient
commercial success to be published, may benefit fully from federal copyright
protection.
It should be noted that to a small extent some state common law
protection has not been preempted by the new copyright law.' 8 Works
which are not fixed in a tangible medium of expression are not "created" as the
word is used in the new law, and thus are not subject to federal copyright
protection. 19
B. Copyright Term
Federal preemption of copyright protection may be the most important
theoretical improvement in the new law, but in purely practical terms the
most important advance is the extension of the copyright term for works
copyrighted both before and after the effective date of the new law, January
1, 1978.20
15 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 410(c) (West Supp. 1977) states that: "[T]he certificate
of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate."
The certificate of registration is issued by the Register of Copyrights under seal of the Copyright
Office after it is determined that all materials deposited constitute copyrightable subject matter,
and that all other legal and formal requirements of the Copyright Act have been met. Id. §
410(a).
11 The courts have long struggled with the definition of "publication." When is "publication"
a general publication disseminating among or making the work available to the general public?
Gustave v. Zuppiger, 24 Ariz. App. 557,540 P.2d 176 (1975); Jewelers' Mercantile Agency Ltd. v.
Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872 (1898). When is publication special
and limited so as not to constitute publication? Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F.
Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); White v. Kimmel, 94 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. Cal. 1950). When has the
work been dedicated to the public? Vic Alexander & Assoc. v. Cheyenne Neon Sign Co., 417
P.2d 921 (Wyo. 1966).
The United States Supreme Court refused to apply the term to categories of writings which
Congress had not brought within the scope of federal statute. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546(1973).
17 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (West Supp. 1977).
1' Compare 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1970) (repealed 1976) with Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §
102(a) (West Supp. 1977).
"9 Copyright Act of 1976,17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (West Supp. 1977). Protection extends only to
works which are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright. These works include: literary works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreogra-
phic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures, and audiovisual works;
sound recordings; including compilations and derivative works. Id. § 102(a). Section 102(b)
specifically excludes from copyright protection any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Id. § 102(b).
20 Id. §§ 302-305.
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The 1909 law granted an initial copyright term of twenty-eight years. 2' If
the work was properly renewed in its twenty-eighth year, a renewal term of
twenty-eight years was granted. Proper renewal, then, resulted in a total
term of fifty-six years.2 2 The new law extends the total term to seventy-five
years for works protected by federal copyright as of the new law's effective
date by adding an additional nineteen years to the renewal term.2 3 Thus, a
work copyrighted before January 1, 1978 will have the same initial term of
twenty-eight years, but will be entitled to a longer renewal term of forty-
seven years. The nineteen-year addition to the renewal term is automatic for
works already in their renewal term on January 1, 1978.24 It is important to
note, however, that works in their initial term on January 1, 1978 must still be
renewed at the proper time2 5 to enjoy the extended term of the new law. 26
Failure to renew properly will cause the work to pass into the public domain
at the end of the initial term.
While the extension of term for already-existing copyrights is significant,
the major advance in the term of copyright protection applies to works
created or copyrighted on or after January 1, 1978. The basic term of
copyright protection for such works is not a constant term of years, but is
based on the life of the author; copyright will exist for the author's life and for
fifty years after his or her death. 27
A term based on the life of the author is especially appropriate for three
reasons. First, a life plus fifty-year provision comports with constitutional
doctrine seeking the promotion of science and art and the limited protection
of authors and inventors.28 A fifty-six year term is too short a period in which
21 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (repealed 1976).
22 Id.
23 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(a) (West Supp. 1977).
24Id.§304(b). This increase in renewal term duration took effect immediately upon the 1976
Copyright Act's enactment, October 19,1976, rather than upon the general effective date, January
1, 1978. Copyright Act of 1976, Transitional and Supplementary Provisions § 102.
25 Timely application for renewal of a copyright in its first term on January 1, 1978 requires the
applicant to submit an application to the Copyright Office to register the application within one
year before the copyright is scheduled to expire. Id. § 304(a).
26 Id. Further, an additional extension of copyright term has been effected by a provision of
the new law which carries copyright protection through the end of the calendar year in which it
would otherwise expire, rather than permitting expiration on the anniversary date of the
copyright. Id. § 305.
27 Id. § 302. This term also applies to works created but not copyrighted or published before
January 1, 1978. Thus, certain works formerly protected by state common law because
"unpublished" under the 1909 Act now receive federal copyright protection. See notes 9-10
supra and accompanying text. In no case will such protection last for less than 25 additional
years, until December 31, 2002. If the work is published before December 21, 2002, it will be
protected for at least another 25 years, until December 21,2027. Id. § 303.
28 The congressional reports note that "by far their most important legislative goal" in
sponsoring this copyright revision was the adoption of copyright protection for the author's life
plus 50 years. This provision was considered by the Register of Copyrights to be the "foundation
of the entire bill." 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 117: 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at
133.
An argument against the life plus fifty year term, voiced by Irwin Goldbloom, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Division of the Justice Department, was that an extension
of copyright protection for a term of the author's life plus 50 years was contrary to the intent of the
founding fathers of the Constitution in providing for limited protection of an author's works. See
note lO supra. Instead, the Justice Department favored extending copyright protection to a term
[Vol. 26: 515
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to insure an author and his dependents the fair economic benefits of his work,
or to provide an incentive for creation and dissemination of that work given
the increase in life expectancy since the 1909 Act. Indeed, under the 1909
copyright law many creators saw their work go into the public domain during
their lifetimes. In addition, too short a term harms an author without
providing any substantial benefit to the public, since the price of public
domain works is rarely lower than the price charged for copyrighted works.
With the growth of the communications media, the commercial life of many
works has been substantially lengthened. A longer term is necessary to offer
copyright protection for those works whose value is not recognized until
many years after their initial promotion.
Secondly, a term based on the life of the author makes possible the
elimination of the renewal requirement of the 1909 copyright law, thereby
removing the substantial burden renewal placed upon authors.
Lastly, almost every country in the world has adopted a copyright term of
the life of the author plus fifty years or more. The sore point in international
copyright relations caused by foreign countries giving longer copyright
protection to American works than the United States gives to foreign works is
cured by the new law.
A term based on the life of the author presents special problems for
computation of the term when a work is the result of multiple authorship. The
new law resolves this simply and fairly by basing the life plus fifty-year
provision on the death of the last survivor of a group of joint authors1 9
Finally, a new right, the right of termination relating both to term and
transfers of copyright, is contained in the 1976 Copyright Act. Under the
1909 Act, authors had an opportunity to reclaim the rights in their works from
assignees at the time of renewal. 30 Authors usually assigned renewal rights
with the original assignment of copyright. However, if an author died before
the initial term expired, the renewal right vested in the author's surviving
spouse and children, notwithstanding any assignment of the renewal rights by
the author.3 Thus, to some degree authors and their heirs were protected
of 56 years or the author's life, whichever was longer, feeling such a term of copyright protection
more compatible with the constitutional mandate of "limited" protection. Hearings on H.R.
2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 141-43 (1975) (statement of Irwin Cold-
bloom).
This contention, however, was sufficiently rebutted in the congressional reports to lead
Congress to conclude that, "[t]he need for a longer term of copyright [had] been conclusively
demonstrated." 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 118; 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at
135.
29 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(b) (West Supp. 1977). Another case in which a
term based on the life of the author presents special problems occurs when "authorship" is vested
in a corporation or when the author's identity is unknown. In cases of works made for hire,
anonymous works, or pseudonymous works, the new law grants a term of 75 years from
publication or 100 years from creation, whichever expires first. Id. § 302(c).
30 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (repealed 1976).
31 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (repealed 1976).
The proposition of renewal right vestment in the author's heirs notwithstanding any assign-
ment of renewal rights made by the author is now a firmly established rule of copyright law. See,
e.g., Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1975); Rose v. Bourne, Inc., 279 F.2d
79 (2d Cir. 1960); Hill & Range Songs, Inc. v. Fred Rose Music, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 420 (M.D. Tenn.
1975).
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against unremunerative initial transfers of copyright by recapture at renewal.
In practice, recapture of the copyrights at the time of renewal did not often
occur because assignees would obtain grants of contingent future interests in
the renewal copyright from the author's spouse and children while the author
was still living, which insured continued possession of the copyright during
the renewal period.
Given a single term based on the life of the author and the elimination of
the renewal procedure, the possibility of recapture has been lost under the
new law. Congress has therefore created the right of termination, 32 under
which the author or his heirs may in certain circumstances recapture copy-
rights previously assigned, notwithstanding a contractual agreement. Two
such termination rights were created. One allows recapture of works
assigned before January 1, 1978, for the additional nineteen years added to the
renewal term, which would otherwise be a "windfall" period for the assig-
nee. 3  The other allows recapture of works assigned after January 1, 1978,
generally thirty-five years after the assignment is made.34
II. IMPROVEMENT IN SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
The 1976 Copyright Act contains significant advances in the substantive
rights protected by copyright. While an exhaustive list of these improve-
ments is beyond the scope of this Article, some of the major advances for
visual and performing artists may be noted.
First, protection has been explicitly extended to a new category -
pantomime and choreographic works.35 The 1909 Act did not expressly
include choreographic works, but protection could be obtained for those
choreographic works which fit into the category of "dramatic" works, that is,
which had a definite plot line or conveyed definite emotions which could be
32 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203, 304(c) (West Supp. 177).
31 Id. § 304(c). This termination right may be exercised by the author of a singly authored
work, by an author or authors of a jointly authored work (to the extent of their interest in the
work), or by the heirs of such authors as their interests are explained in section 304(c)(1) and (2).
The right may not be exercised if the copyright was granted by the author's will. An eligible
individual wishing to exercise this right may do so anytime within5years after January 1,1978, or
5 years after the original 56 year copyright term expired, whichever is later. Id. § 304(c)(3).
In order to make such a termination effecfive, notice must be served upon the grantee or
assignee at least 2 and not less than 10 years before the date chosen for termination by the author
or his heirs. The notice must also include a statement of the effective date of termination, must be
signed by everyone exercising their right of termination (authors, joint authors, heirs or their
authorized agents), and must comply with any further regulations prescribed by the Register of
Copyrights. Id. § 304(c)(4)(A) and (B).
"4 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 203 (West Supp. 1977). The right to terminate a
copyright granted after January 1,1978, is established in an author, authors, or particular heirs of
authors according to a specific grant of such a right explained in section 203(a)(1) and (2). These
specific grants are quite similar to those established in section 304(c)(1) and (2). See note 33
supra. Termination under this section is also subject to the same notice requirements as
termination of assignments made prior to January 1, 1978. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §
203(a)(4) (A), (B) (West Supp. 1977), See note 37 supra.
An eligible individual terminating under this section may do so within 5 years after the
expiration of a,35 year period commencing with the date of the grant. However, if the grant of
the copyright extends over the right of publication of the work, the individual choosing to
terminate has until 35 years from the date of work's publication or 40 years after the date of the
grant, whichever is shorter. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
15 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 26: 515
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reduced to writing. Protection was not granted for choreographic works
which were not "dramatic," creating difficulty for choreographers. 36 The
new law's addition of all forms of choreographic works as a distinct category
subject to copyright eliminates the classification problem in favor of the
creator.
The new law also contains a significant clarification of the rights protected
by copyright. The 1909 law contained a long list of the exclusive rights of the
copyright proprietor. For various types of works, these included the rights
to: "print, reprint, publish, copy and vend";37 "translate . .. or make any
other version ... dramatize.. . convert.., arrange or adapt.., complete,
execute and finish";38 "deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present...
play or perform .. .exhibit, represent, produce, or reproduce";39 and so on.
This long and confusing list of exclusive rights has been simplified to five
basic rights under the new law:4"
1. The right to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords; 4'
2. The right to prepare derivative works;4 2
3. The right to distribute copies or phonorecords to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease or lending;43
4. The right to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 44
5. The right to display the copyrighted work publicly. 45
16 Guidelines established by the courts for determining when an artistic work such as
choreography was "dramatic" and when it was not were, by their very nature, vague. This was
one definition of a "dramatic" work extracted from Fuller v. Bemis, 50 F. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1892): "It
is essential to such a composition that it should tell some story. The plot may be simple. It may
be but the narrative or representation of a single transaction; but it must repeat or mimic some
action, speech, emotion, passion, or character, real or imaginary." Id. at 929.
The detailed stage instructions involved in Fuller, which directed explicitly the movements of
a single female dancer, as well as the lighting and scenery involved in a three act presentation
were held to be nondramatic and to constitute only an attractive woman "illustrating the poetry of
motion in a singularly graceful fashion." Id.
aT 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1970) (repealed 1976).
38 Id. § 1(b).
31 Id. § 1(c).
40 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West Supp. 1977).
41 Id. § 106(1). A reproduction differs from a display (§ 106(5)) in that the tangible form of a
reproduction must be " 'sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.' Thus, the showing of
images on a screen or tube would not be a violation of clause (1), although it might come within
the scope of clause (5)." 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note, 5, at 62.
42 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(2) (West Supp. 1977). The right to prepare
derivative works is overlapped by, but broader in scope than the right to reproduce the work, in
that the derivative work may infringe upon the copyright owner's right even though nothing is
ever fixed in tangible form.
4- Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(3) (West Supp. 1977).
41 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(4) (West Supp. 1977). This right is limited to
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works. Id.
45 Id. §106(5). This right is limited to literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial graphic or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work. Id. The right to display under the 1909 Act was
uncertain and subject to varied interpretations. Thus, the statutory recognition given to this right
is the first such recognition in American copyright law. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 63.
19771
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It is clear from both the relevant definitions in the new law 46 and the language
of the congressional reports4 7 that a very broad reading of these rights in favor
of the copyright owner was intended.
Other changes in the new law relating to specific visual or performing arts
are noteworthy. In the field of music, one significant change is the elimination
of the "for profit" limitation on the exclusive right to perform nondramatic
musical compositions publicly.4 8  Very limited and specific exemptions for
performances with certain educational and religious purposes were substitut-
ed for the general non-profit limitation. Generally, performances in the course
of face-to-face teaching activities49 or religious services at a place of worship 50
4 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1977). Not only are all the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner under the old Act contained in the new Act, but the new Act
includes much more, as illuminated by the definitions under the new Act. For example, in
reference to section 106(2), the right to prepare derivative works, section 101 defines a derivative
work as:
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording,
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed or adapted [or] work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship ...
Id. (emphasis added).
17 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 5, 61-65. "Each of the five enumerated rights may be
subdivided indefinitely and . .. each subdivision of an exclusive right may be owned and
enforced separately." Id. at 61.
41 Under the old act, [any person entitled thereto . . . shall have the exclusive right:
. [tlo perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit .... ".17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970)
(repealed 1976).
The approach under the new law is similar to many foreign laws. It protects the copyright
proprietor by prescribing an initial broad statement of a public performance right followed by
specific well-defined exemptions. The deletion of the "for profit" limitation is a more reasonable
approach because of the fading distinction between commercial and "nonprofit" organizations.
The modem "nonprofit" organization is apt to be highly subsidized and therefore as able to pay
royalties as any commercial organization. "In addition to these trends, it is worth noting that
performances and displays are continuing to supplant markets for printed copies and that in the
future a broad 'not for profit' exemption could not only hurt authors but could dry up their
incentive to write." 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 59.
4' The following are not infringements of copyright:
(1) performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils in the course of a face-
to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational institution, . ..unless, in the case
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, the performance, or the display ... is
given by means of a copy that was not lawfully made ... and that the person
responsible for the performance knew or had reason to believe was not lawfully made;
(2) performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work or display of a work
... if (A) the performance or display is a regular part of the systematic instructional
activities of a governmental body or a nonprofit educational institution; and . .. (C)
the transmission is made primarily for (i) reception in ...places normally devoted to
instruction, or (ii) reception by persons . .. [whose] disabilities or other special
circumstances prevent their attendance in ...places normally devoted to instruction.
or (iii) reception by officers or employees of governmental bodies as part of their official
duties or employment . ...
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 110(1), (2) (West Supp. 1977). These two clauses are
intended to encompass any performance or display which is used in systematic instruction. The
phrase "face-to-face" is used to distinguish performances or displays which are transmitted,
either by broadcasting or any other form of transmission into a classroom or similar place devoted
to instruction. Another requirement of section 110, clause I is that the work must be performed or
displayed by instructors or pupils, not by outside artists brought into the instructional environ-
ment specifically for the purpose. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 81-82.
0 "[Tihe following are not infringements of copyright: ... (3) performance of non-
[Vol. 26: 515
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are exempt and will not require a license from the copyright owner. Perfor-
mances without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage, and
in which no performer, promoter, or organizer is paid, are also exempt in
limited circumstances. 5' Except for these very limited exemptions, all public
performances of nondramatic musical works whether "for profit" or not must
be licensed by the copyright owner or his representative. The elimination of
the "for profit" limitation together with a broadened definition of a "public"
performance will enable authors, composers, and publishers of copyrighted
music to license performances which were not licensed under the 1909 law,
and to receive income from such performances.
Another advance in the field of music, related to the income which the
creator will earn from his work, concerns the compulsory license fee for
sound recordings. Under the 1909 law, the compulsory license fee was set at
two cents per record manufactured. 51 Under the new law, the compulsory
license fee is increased to two and three-quarter cents or one half-cent per
minute, whichever is greater, for each record distributed.53
dramatic literary or musical work or of a dramatico-musical work of a religious nature, or display
of a work, in the course of services at a place of worship or other religious assembly ....
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 110(3). This exemption is similar to the exemption in the
1909 Act that "nothing in this title shall be so construed as to prevent the performance of religious
or secular works . . .provided the performance is given for charitable or educational purposes
and not for profit." 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) (repealed 1976).
The purpose [in the 1976 Act] is to exempt certain performances of sacred music that
might be regarded as 'dramatic' in nature, such as oratorios, cantatas, musical settings of
the mass, choral services, and the like. The exemption is not intended to cover
performances of secular operas, musical plays, motion pictures, and the like, even if
they have an underlying religious or philosophical theme and take place 'in the course of
[religious] services.'
1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 84. This exemption excludes any kind of social, educational,
or fund-raising activities at a place of worship by requiring the performance or display to be "in
the course of services."
51 CoYRciTrr AcT of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 110(4) (West Supp. 1977). This exemption is only
applicable to public performances given directly in the presence of an audience, and, though the
performance may be live or mechanical (e.g., playing phonorecords or a television), it does not
include a "transmission to the public." Also, despite the limitation, the exemption would not be
lost if the performers, promoters, or organizers are paid a salary for duties encompassing the
performance and not for the performance directly. Lastly, the commercial advantage provision
expressly adopts the court established principle that public performances given or sponsored in
connection with a commercial or profit-making enterprise are not exempt even though the public
is not charged for seeing or hearing the performance. 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 76-7;
1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 85.
For examples of cases under the 1909 Act that found this commercial advantage concept, see
Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (music played as an incident to other entertainment
for which the public had paid was a "for profit" performance); Chappel & Co. v. Middletown
Farmer's Market & Auction Co., 334 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1964) (playing recorded music in a store for
the entertainment and amusement of the patrons and to make the place of business more
attractive was a "for profit" performance); Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial
Radio Fund, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), afl'd, 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 766 (1944) (broadcast of copyrighted material on a sustaining program of a non-profit radio
station was "for profit" since it was a part of the general business of the station though it brought in
no revenue directly); Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Nebraska, 58 F. Supp. 523
(D. Neb. 1944), afl'd, 157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 809, rehearing denied,
330 U.S. 854 (1947) (public performance of a musical composition in a dining room of a hotel, a
skating rink, or a dance hall is a "for profit" performance).
52 17 U.S.C. § I(e) (1970) (repealed 1976).
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 115 (West Supp. 1977). This $ection provides, inter
alia, that a record should be considered to be "distributed" when the party exercising the
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Certain user industries, which had been exempt or had not paid license fees
under the old law, will now be required to pay for the copyrighted works they
use. In the musical field, jukebox operators will pay an annual compulsory
license fee of eight dollars per jukebox, to be divided among copyright
proprietors through performing rights organizations such as ASCAP.54 Cable
television, previously exempt from royalty payments for use of copyrighted
works when simultaneously retransmitting broadcast signals,55 will now be
subject to compulsory licensing for such secondary transmissions under a
complicated statutory formula. 5  The royalties will be divided among
copyright proprietors.
Of interest to both musical and visual artists, public broadcasting will
finally pay license fees for the use of nondramatic musical, pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works in its broadcasts.57  Again, such uses are subject to
compulsory licensing, but no statutory license fee is set. Rather, voluntary
agreements are encouraged, but if none can be worked out, the license fees
will be set by a new agency in the legislative branch, the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal.58
The compulsory license for public broadcasting should be of special
interest to visual artists whose pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works are
displayed on public broadcasting's programs. It is safe to assume, as has been
the case in the past, that public broadcasting will attempt to pay as little as
possible for the creative works it uses. Authors and composers of musical
compositions have long had national organizations such as ASCAP to license
the nondramatic performance of their works and to protect their interests in
negotiations with large industries like public broadcasting. Visual artists,
however, had no such national organization, and the compulsory license of
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works to public broadcasting may provide
the impetus for establishment of such an organization.
Other improvements in the law concerning the visual arts should also be
noted. The new law expressly provides that ownership of copyright is
distinct from ownership of the material object embodying the copyrighted
work.59 Coupled with federal preemption of state common law copyright, 0
compulsory license voluntarily and permanently parts with possession of the record. Id. §
115(c)(2).
54 Id. § 116(b).
11 Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp.
v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). Both of these decisions urged Congress to
consider and determine the scope and extent of liability upon revision of the 1909 Act.
56 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West Supp. 1977). Part of the complication is the
result of taking into account the rules adopted by the FCC to govern the cable TV industry. The
statutory formula adopted here is meant to avoid interfering with FCC rules or affecting
"communications policy," while recognizing the liability of cable operators to the creators of the
copyrighted program material that they carry. 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 79; 1976
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 89.
Y, Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 118 (West Supp. 1977).
s Id. 9 118(b). The Copyright Royalty Tribunal will also periodically review and adjust all
other statutory compulsory license fees.
In early 1978, the Tribunal held the first public broadcasting proceedings, and issued its
determination of reasonable fees and terms on June 8, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 25068 (1978). For
regulations embodying that decision, see 37 C.F.R. §§ 304.1 et. seq.
51 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 202 (West Supp. 1977).
60 Id. § 301.
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the new law has the effect of overruling the common law doctrine that the sale
of an unpublished material object, especially a work of visual art, carries with
it the sale of the copyright in the work.6
In addition, the new law clarifies the copyright owner's right to place a
work of visual art on exhibition without fear of losing his copyright. There
had been some difficulty with the new law's definition of "publication" as
applied to exhibitions of works of visual art. While the "public.., display
of a work does not of itself constitute publication . .. [t]he offering to
distribute copies . . . to a group of persons for purposes of further distribu-
tion .. .or public display, [does constitute] publication."62 It had been
feared that the offering of a work for sale by an art gallery would thus
constitute publication, and would threaten loss of the work's copyright if
proper notice is not affixed. Both the Senate and House reports on the new
law, however, expressly state that such is not the case.
63
III. COPYRIGHT FORMALITIES
Creators, and especially visual artists, have been troubled by the copyright
formalities of notice, deposit, and registration. Certainly, from the creator's
point of view the best copyright system would be one with no formalities
whatsoever. Indeed, such copyright systems exist throughout Europe,
perhaps reflecting a long-standing European cultural presumption in favor of
authorship.
A significant drawback of the 1909 Copyright Act and preceding copy-
right acts was the requirement of rigid adherence to copyright formalities.
Improper placement or omission of the copyright notice almost always
worked to deprive the copyright owner of his property. While the 1976
Copyright Act makes significant progress in easing the requirements for
compliance with copyright formalities, the total elimination of copyright
formalities is a task for the next copyright revision, and it is important to note
that in many ways compliance with formalities becomes even more important
under the new law.
A. Copyright Notice
The requirements concerning copyright notice6 4 are eased in two substan-
tial ways. First, the technical requirements regarding the notice are relaxed.
No longer must the notice appear in a specific location to be effective.
61 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 108; 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 124. A
specific written conveyance of rights would be required in order for a sale of any material object
to carry with it a transfer of copyright. See Pushman v. New York Graphic Society, Inc., 287 N.Y.
302,39 N.E.2d 249 (1942) (common law doctrine that authors and artists were presumed to have
transfered property rights when they sold their work).
61 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1977).
63 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 126-127, 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 143-144.
This is meant to include public display "of a copy by any means, including projectors, television
or cathode ray tubes connected with information storage and retrieval systems, or in connection
with the public performance of a work by means of copies or phonorecords, whether in the
presence of an audience or through television, radio, computer transmissions, or any other
process." Id.
64 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-406 (West Supp. 1977).
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Rather, the new law provides that it shall be placed "in such manner and
location as to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright.'" 5  The
Register of Copyrights is given the responsibility of prescribing by regulation
specific methods of affixation and positions on various types of works,
although the regulations will not be considered exhaustive. 6
This change in the law is especially significant for visual artists, who for
many years have objected to the old law's notice requirement on the grounds
that a copyright notice marred the work's artistic character. The new law
clearly intends that this shall not be the case in the future. For example, in the
case of paintings the Register of Copyrights has said that she believes a notice
affixed to the back of a painting, rather than the front, would satisfy the new
law's notice requirement.67
Copyright notice has included the use of three elements: the word
"Copyright," the abbreviation "Copr.," or the symbol "@"; the year of first
publication; and the name of the copyright proprietor. 68 The new law, like
the old law, does not require the year date on pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works with accompanying text reproduced in greeting cards, postcards,
stationery, jewelry, dolls, toys, or other useful articles. 69 For all types of
works, an abbreviation by which the copyright owner can be recognized, or a
known alternative designation, may be substituted for the name of the
copyright owner.7 0 Further, contributions, except advertisements, to collec-
tive works such as newspapers or periodicals need not bear separate notices of
copyright in addition to the notice applicable to the work as a whole."'
The second easing of the notice formality concerns an error in or omission
of the notice. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, a substantial error in the
copyright notice or the omission of the notice from published copies could
cause loss of the copyright. The 1976 Copyright Act contains saving provi-
sions in such cases. If the copyright owner's notice is omitted from copies of
the work, and corrective steps are taken within five years of publication, the
work will not be lost to the public domain. 72 In case of error in the copyright
notice, the new law permits corrective registration. While innocent infrin-
65 Id. § 401(c).
66 Id.
67 Remarks by Hon. Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights at "Program on the 1976
Copyright Act," in New York City (May 7, 1977). The Copyright Office's regulations have
embodied this view, 37 C.F.R. § 201.20.
68 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1970) (repealed 1976); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (West
Supp. 1977).
6' See note 68 supra.
70 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 401(b) (3) (West Supp. 1977). The 1909 Copyright Act
required that in "the case . . . of copies of works specified [maps; works of art; models or
designs for works of art; reproductions of a work of art; drawings or plastic works of a scientific or
technical character; photographs) notice may consist of the letter c enclosed within a circle, thus
6, accompanied by the initials, monogram, mark or symbol of the copyright proprietor: Pro-
vided that on some accessible portion of such copies . . . his name shall appear." 17 U.S.C. § 19
(1970) (repealed 1976).
71 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 404 (West Supp. 1977).
72 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 405 (West Supp. 1977). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 21 (1970)
(repealed 1976) for the 1909 Copyright Act's provision for treatment of accidental omission of
notice.
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gers may not be liable in cases of erroneous notice, in no event will the
copyright be 1ost. 73
B. Deposit of Copies
As under the 1909 Copyright Act, the deposit of one or more copies of the
work is required by the 1976 Copyright Act upon publication.7 4 Registration
of the work must be accompanied by deposit if no deposit has previously
been made. 75  In the past, the deposit requirements have been a severe
burden on those working in the fine arts. For example, when only fifty copies
of a work of fine art are produced, the requirement that one or two'of the best
copies be deposited is obviously a great artistic and financial hardship on the
creator. To correct this inequity, the new law provides that in such
circumstances the work shall be exempt from the deposit requirements.7 6
C. Copyright Registration
Registration is entirely permissive under the 1976 Copyright Act.7 7 A
single registration for a group of related works is now allowed .7  Further, the
Register of Copyrights is directed to establish regulations permitting a single
registration for a group of works by the same individual author, all first
published as contributions to periodicals within a twelve-month period.79
Single renewal registration in similar circumstances is also allowed.8 0 These
provisions will be of especial help to visual artists such as cartoonists, whose
works are published in periodicals.
In some ways, however, the registration requirements are harsher under
the new law than the old. As under the 1909 Act,8 ' if registration is not made
the copyright owner may not sue for copyright infringement. 2 But the 1909
Act allowed infringement suits once registration was made, with the full
availability of all remedies. Under the new law, even if registration is made
subsequent to infringement, the copyright owner may lose the right to recover
statutory damages and attorney's fees depending on the dates of infringe-
ment, publication, and registration.8 3  Thus, copyright registration is of
71 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 406 (West Supp. 1977).
74 Id. § 407. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1970) (repealed 1976). Compliance with section 13 of the
1909 Copyright Act was a requirement for copyright protection, although the late deposit of
copies did not bar a suit for copyright infringement for acts occurring prior to deposit.
Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
71 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(b) (West Supp. 1977). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 11(1970)
(repealed 1976).
71 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 407(c) (West Supp. 1977). See note 61 supra.
7 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (West Supp. 1977). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 11(1970)
(repealed 1976).
71 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(b)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
71 Id. § 408(c)(2). Such registration is contingent upon compliance with the requirements of
section 408(c)(2).
80 Id. § 408(c)(3). Single registration is contingent upon compliance with the requirements of
section 408(c) (3).
s' 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1970) (repealed 1976).
s Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (West Supp. 1977).
83 Id. § 412.
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extreme importance, and the best advice to a creator is, to register his work
with the Copyright Office as soon as possible - certainly immediately upon
publication.
It should also be noted that transfers of copyright are not valid unless they
are embodied in a written instrument,8 4 and that no action for infringement by
the transferee may be brought until the transfer is recorded in the Copyright
Office.8 5
IV. CONCLUSION
In the past, artists in different fields, especially in the visual arts, were either
unaware of the benefits of copyright or simply did not bother to take
advantage of the law. The 1976 Copyright Act marks a quantum leap
forward for authors and composers of musical compositions, for creators of
choreographic works, for artists working in the pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural arts, and indeed for all authors in the protection of their creations.
It is now up to the creators to make full use of the protection which the new
law affords.
84 Id. § 204(a). See also 17 U.S.C. § 28 (1970) (repealed 1976), which also required a writing
for valid assignment of a copyright.
15 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 205(d) (West Supp. 1977).
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